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 CONVERSATIONS  
WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE BELLY OF THE BEHEMOTH: A 
CONVERSATION WITH ANDREW ROSS 
Keith Beattie. 
Andrew Ross is Director of the American Studies Program at New York University. His 
works include The Failure of Modernism (1986), No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture 
(1989), Strange Weather: Culture, Science and Technology in the Age of Limits, and The Chicago 
Gangster Theory of Life: Nature's Debt to Society (1995). He is editor of Universal Abandon? The 
Politics of Postmodernism (1988), and co-editor of Technoculture (1991) and Microphone Fiends: 
Youth Music and Youth Culture (1994). Ross is a co-editor of Social Text, and contributes a 
regular column, 'Weather Reporf , to the journal Artforum. He frequently publishes in The 
Nation, South Atlantic Quarterly, and The Village Voice. Papers by Ross have appeared in a 
variety of journals concerned with critical and cultural theory, and in numerous edited 
collections on topics which include film genres, youth music, current and emerging 
informational conditions, and the culture of science. The following conversation took place 
in Ross's office at New York University on 18 July 1995. 
KB: My first question relates to an area of investigation which links two fields of 
concern within your work, namely, postmodernism and ecological discourse. 
In response to a question following the presentation of your paper TSIew Age 
Technoculture' at the 'Cultural Studies: Now and in the Future' conference at 
the University of Illinois in 1990 you mentioned the beginnings of ways 'to 
think of situating ecological questions within the context of the postmodern 
debate', ways which are capable of transforming the terms of this debate. 
Would you care to expand on this suggestion? 
AR: I think there's been a continuing lack of attention to ecological concerns in the 
circles that are ordinarily thought of as postmodernist. Even in the burgeoning 
field of science studies there hasn't been much priority given to the ecological 
sciences, where for the most part the focus has been on the core sciences like 
physics and biology. Possible exceptions would be environmental ethics 
which nevertheless is a tradition which has been ill-equipped, because of its 
purist appeals to a pristine nature ethic, to deal with developments like free 
market environmentalism: the rise of risk assessment pioneered in 
environmentalism and now at the heart of government as a new form of 
administrative rationality and fiscal policy making in our budget-conscious 
climate. 
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There have been two major components to how ecological concerns really 
should be entering into these debates. One of them would be how ecological 
concerns have fed into the massive public anxiety about the effects of 
industrialisation. This anxiety is measured in the extent o which technophobia 
is no longer a knee-jerk response to new fangled objects and elitist expertise 
among scientists; it's part of our daily lives now to such an extent hat I think 
you can talk of technophobia as a very ordinary critique of technoscience. As 
such, technophobia is an offshoot of Enlightenment rationality and therefore 
part of our modernist birthright in the West, and not, as conservatives in 
science are currently announcing, an antiscience reaction. 
That's one context. The other one would be thinking about realism in general, 
but more specifically scientific realism or the core of the precepts that form 
the ideology of scientific realism. Much of the work that is being done in 
science studies, which is generally described as social constructionist work, is 
currently being very efficiently trivialised in the same way that textualist 
postmodernist work was trivialised and reduced to a stereotype. 
Constructionists are portrayed as sort of boi f o nihilists who deny the existence 
of recessive genes or subatomic particles or even the laws of gravity. Of 
course in the wings is always the effigy of the leftist technophobe Luddite 
waiting to be wheeled in for a smoky turn on the pyre. So, I would say that at 
least those two components should be feeding into the debates about 
postmodernism and ecological discourse. 
KB: The relationship you posit between ecological discourses and postmodernism 
distinguishes your work from Bruno Latour's We Have Never Been Modern, a
book which in certain respects has some features which are similar to your 
position in The Chicago Gangster Theory of Life. Latour argues that modernity 
constructs systems which mix politics, science, technology and nature, so- 
called liybrids' exemplified in the ozone debate and the idea of global 
wanning. As these systems proliferate, attempts at keeping nature and culture 
in their separate categories are problematised, a point which is in keeping 
with your argument in The Chicago Gangster Theory. Rather than try to 
continue to separate nature and culture, Latour proposes that the categories 
themselves hould be redefined, with a resultant rewriting of the definition of 
modernity. Latour, then, would argue for a renovation of the theory of 
modernity. Is this a worthwhile task at this moment, or do the hybrids' 
Latour refers to point to the existence of a condition most suitably theorised 
as postmodern? 
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AR: I'm as sympathetic to Latour's arguments as to those of Ulrich Beck, the 
German sociologist of the Risk Society who argues that this popular type of 
scepticism which Tve described is very much an extension of modernity, a 
phase of reflexive modernisation, as he terms it, rather than an autonomous 
historical development that some people describe as postmodernist. Having 
said that, like many American intellectuals I've put the process of theorising 
on the back burner because of the embattled state of American intellectual life 
as a result of the culture wars. Many folks are in the same boat as myself; we 
consider theorising a little bit of a luxury right now because so much of our 
thought and work is being directed to responding to the neo-McCarthyist 
onslaught that is a result of the new conservative climate. Recently, we have 
seen the onset of the Science Wars which are very much a second front which 
has been opened up in the Culture Wars, coordinated by the same conservative 
associations and scholars, funded by the same right-wing foundations, and 
featuring the same kind of multicultural scapegoats who are presented as a 
clear and present danger to the Republic. The current actic in the science 
wars is to link all of the postmodernists and social constructionists and the 
mulüculturalists along with practitioners of Nazi- Aryan science and astrologers 
and New Agers and advocates of every last cult imaginable as a dangerous 
antiscience movement hat wants to deny the achievements of Enlightenment, 
modernity and reason. 
That's the kind of climate in which one is obliged to think about some of those 
ideas your question raises, a remarkable reminder of how tenuous knowledge 
claims can be in a national culture which has a recent memory of McCarthyism 
and eugenics movements. The return of biologism and biological determinism 
and social Darwinism to the forefront ofsocial policy making and discussion 
in the US has been a significant recent development and something which 
we've had to respond to whether we like it or not. My most recent book, The 
Chicago Gangster Theory of Life, is very much a polemic against the kind of 
politics that draws upon the authority of appeals to biology and nature. 
That's an old struggle, not exactly postmodernist, although sciences like 
molecular biology have provided a new context for these forms of biopolitics. 
KB: I'd like to follow your emphasis on politics within the current US cultural 
scene by referring to the place of a politics of difference within your work. In 
the Introduction to Universal Abandon? you argue that 'a politics of racial, 
sexual, and ethnic difference are not only symptoms of, but also essential 
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strategies for coping with a postmodernist culture'. Such a politics may be a 
feature of contemporary culture, yet it could be conceived that this presence 
is nothing more than an extension of the place of such a politics under 
modernism where the construction of otherness and moments of identity 
resulted in various forms of political reaction. Have the claims for an exclusive 
relationship between a politics of difference and contemporary postmodern 
culture been overstated? 
AR: In many cases the relationship has been corrupted. A case in point would be 
the development of conservative multiculturalism and racist multiculturalism, 
most infamously in the formulation provided by the authors of The Bell 
Curve, Charles Murray and Richard Hermstein. Their term for these features 
is 'wise ethnocentrism' but it basically boils down to the idea that there are 
cultural differences in society which should be preserved and that ethnic 
minority cultures in particular should be released from the traditional 
injunction of American ethnic pluralism to assimilate and to preserve what 
Murray and Herrnstein call their 'clannish self-esteem7 and to keep to separate 
spheres. Cultures are different, and they should remain so - best not to mix 
at all, in other words. Thus what is basically a prescription for segregationism 
masquerades as a sort of liberal tolerance for human variation and cultural 
differences. 
Etienne Balibar has written about the rise of neoracism which refers to race 
based on cultural rather than biological appeals. Culturalism, he argues, has 
come to replace biologism as the basis for a racism without race. I think that 
Balibar's caveats are probably more relevant and appropriate to the insurgent 
European racisms than perhaps the North American racial formation. I think 
he's a little premature for one thing in announcing the passing of biological 
racism. The Bell Curve is only one example, a particularly egregious example, 
but there are all sorts of books which have appeared in recent years which 
revive appeals to genetic determinism and the like. 
As for multiculturalism itself, I think that the one thing that needs to be said is 
that unlike say Australia or Canada, where multiculturalism is top down 
official government policy, in the US it has been seen as a bottom-up movement 
which nonetheless has been transmuted into versions compatible with the 
traditional iberal emphasis on ethnic pluralism. In other words, we are 
seeing not calls for multiracialism but calls for multiculturalism which tend to 
gloss over the differences between dominant and subordinate cultures and 
encourage the idea that racism doesn't exist any more. 
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KB: A definition of the new racism in the US is that it displaces race by privileging 
culture or ethnicity. 
AR: Yes. The cult of ethnicity has come to mean that gender critiques and critiques 
of the hetero normative state have been displaced to some extent. I often think 
that analogies with other postcolonial settler states such as Australia and 
Canada are less relevant han the analogy to slavery societies like Brazil. In 
Brazil, where the official ideology is that of a race-less society, political issues 
get displaced onto class. In the US where the official ideology is of a classless 
society politics tends to get displaced on to race. There continues, however, to 
be massive resistance to dealing with the racial formation of the state. The US 
did not exclude African Americans from the polity; it included African 
Americans as non-participants and that's why there are debates about 
affirmative action right now where I think you can see quite clearly a continuity 
in the historical behaviour of US elites that have been willing to grant forms of 
symbolic justice when pushed to the wall but never economic justice. 
Affirmative action has not for the most part relieved the class polarisation in 
this country along lines of colour, but it has brought many individuals of 
colour into the mainstream public sphere. To overcome racism, it has proven 
necessary to take race into account and not to ignore it. To pretend that the 
playing field is now 'level' is to display an arrogant contempt for both history 
and modernity. 
KB: The need, then, is not to pursue a link between a politics of difference and 
postmodern culture but to define a politics of difference within the US 
context. 
AR: Yes. I think the ideal would involve being much more specific about where, 
when and what claims are to be waged. There is a certain form of radical 
politics which is very dismissive of the idea of rights and which favours 
informality in pursuing cultural justice. There are reasons why that should be 
distrusted now, and not simply because rights are fundamental to any 
discussion about American history and American politics because of the 
questions which come up about constitutionality. Civil rights, which are often 
dismissed by radicals as limited legislation, are very much on the line. The 
idea of civil rights should be expanded. Patricia Williams has argued that civil 
rights should include not just the idea of achieving freedoms and rights but 
also how to expect civility from others, and that's an expanded notion of 
justice that certainly goes beyond the idea of limited, symbolic legislation. 
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KB: One central feature of the postmodern condition is what you call technoculture. 
In your writings on technocultures, I have noted references to Marshall 
McLuhan whose work you have critiqued as a 1960s romanticisation of 'pre- 
industrial ife in the service of postindustrial ideology'. It could also be 
argued that McLuhan was postulating an incipient form of globalisation, yet 
a theory of such devoid of its opposite, the local. The presence of local 
cultures in certain cases marks the boundaries of technoculture. Local cultures 
revise or reject aspects of technoculture. My next question concerns this issue: 
how would you theorise the impact of technoculture inthe context of localised 
reactions to globalisation? 
AR: I think you're dead right as to what McLuhan was glowingly celebrating in 
the 1960s. It was very much the embryonic forms of globalisation that have 
become ascendant in the intervening years largely as a result of the fact that 
capitalism has restructured quite specifically around science, technology and 
medicine. In the process it has developed what has become in many ways an 
international lingua franca for the professional managerial class which is 
cyberculture and all its trappings. Access to advanced technologies in the 
information sector which is accompanied by a language of expertise and a 
sense of comfort with technology that only that class understands. I think 
maybe for the first ime since the preindustrial and preliterate ages, that is 
preliteracy for at least the majority of the population, you have these elites 
speaking a language which is completely inaccessible to large sections of the 
population. And intellectuals of course have been included in those elites, 
being a fraction of the knowledge class, and so most of us have been involved 
in some way with that culture and with that comfort. 
The local/global syndrome has probably been most evident in the forms of 
ethnic self-determination, a dsubnational sovereignty movements that have 
sprung up all over the world in response to the globalising tendency, even as 
the grand bourgeois nation states are on the verge of dissolving, becoming 
part of supranational formations a  a result of NAFTA, GATT, EEC, and the 
Southern Cone or, in the instance of the multinational formations like the UK, 
devolving into something quite different altogether. In the US, I think some of 
the anxiety created by such changes has been evident in the debate between 
monoculturalists and the multiculturalists over national identity. On the 
right, there are the race-based phobias about anything approaching cultural 
equity, and for the liberals an anxiety about the 'centrifugal' tendencies of 
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cultural fragmentation and on the left anxieties about corporate management 
of cultural diversity. You can see the symptoms in all sorts of places, even in 
the rise of the militia movements and the resurrection of states' rights, the 
new Republican devolution of power into the states, and so forth. This is 
happening at the same time that federal government is dissolving what is left 
of the liberal corporate state and removing all national impediments to the 
path of offshore transnational corporations, most notably in the form of 
media goliaths like Disney, Rupert Murdoch and Time- Warner, those very 
corporations that McLuhan was very cosy with. 
KB: What have been termed postcolonial nationalist movements have been 
interpreted as localised reactions to global technoculture. Inyour latest book 
you extend this position by arguing that in the case of Polynesia such 
movements are represented, and represent hemselves, through recourse to 
ecological concerns and questions, not all of which necessarily involve 
progressive outcomes. In a similar way you noted in Strange Weather that, in 
the US context, the language of limits associated with ecological movements 
has often resulted in a particular 'drastic ourse of action'. It seems to me that 
one recent drastic course of action, Reaganism, can be read in the context of 
the discourse of limits. Much of Reagan's popularity was a result of opposition 
to such rhetoric in an appeal to an abandonment of limits as patriotic, as in his 
suggestion that 'as Americans we have every right to dream heroic (or 
limitless) dreams'. Reaganism is still alive in the US in the form of a 'Contract 
With America'. Would you care to comment on the role or the function of a 
discourse of limits in this Reaganite context? 
AR: Reaganism, of course, spoke with a forked tongue and the rhetoric was aimed 
at a very particular social sector for whom wealth was redistributed upwards 
- that was the limitless part which was applied very unevenly. It was under 
Reagan of course that the US saw the emergence of a two-tier society, which is 
recognised as one of the now classic features of postindustrialism, where you 
have a gourmet class and a discount class. The majority of the population 
came under the regime of austerity economics and austerity politics in a way 
that hitherto had been applied to third world sectors by the IMF and the 
World Bank. Here was austerity culture, in other words a discourse of limits 
coining home to roost in the US where the core of the middle class was being 
dissipated. Class polarisation resulted, and the most recent statistics are that 
1 per cent of the American population owns 40 per cent of the wealth which is 
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a statistic redolent of the days of the Robber Barons, while poverty levels are 
higher at 14.5 per cent today than the 12.1 per cent of 1969. What Clinton 
promised to do was to democratise austerity, to extend the discourse of limits 
to everyone. So I think that the issues in your question need to be seen in the 
contexts of the realities and not the rhetoric. 
As for the current ax revolt and the Contract With America, white workers 
have lost 20 per cent of their real wages in the last twenty ears. The only way 
they have left of trying to boost their wages is to reduce taxation. The 
economic desire for some kind of rock bottom survival has been addressed by 
the New Right by exploiting the traditional 'wages of whiteness' employed by 
white workers. Money liberated from the state is money liberated for whites. 
So too the discourse of limits has now been applied to government in the 
suggestion that there are limits to government. That's a very particular 
version of the discourse of limits which is different, I would argue, from an 
ecological argument about the limits to growth of, say, industrial capitalism. 
KB: Your analysis positions the working class within current US political discourse, 
something which has not always been the case in other interpretations. 
AR: Well, yes and no. There has been a significant revival of populist rhetoric from 
the right of the elitist anti-state variety. It's cynical and authoritarian and is 
encouraging many dangerous tendencies, but in some ways it has re-energised 
the whole debate, on the left, about whether the popular classes are voting 
against their interests or not. 
KB: Still within the realm of politics and limits, in The Chicago Gangster Theory of 
Life, you argue that one of the book's many origins lay in the perception that 
environmentalist discourse about scarcity and limitation in the natural world 
was beginning to reinforce, if not translate into, calls for a reduction in rights 
and freedoms in our civil society'. To counteract his movement you argue for 
a libertarian form of post-scarcity politics. To extend this point, then, how 
does such a politics translate into an increase in rights and freedoms in 
society? 
AR: Any form of progressive libertarianism in the current climate has to be 
interpreted as a position against scarcity politics. The 'luxury' of post-scarcity 
politics is put to the side, although I developed certain conceptual strategies 
for thinking about it in the book. We need to throw everything we have 
against pro-scarcity politics. As for the question of limits, let me give you just 
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one example, again with respect to race in reference to the so-called 'colour 
line'. The persistent idea that there is a black and a white nation within the US 
bears very little resemblance to a multiracial constituency where the emerging 
majority of the population is racially mixed. In a pro-scarcity climate, however, 
what happens is that limited resources are made available which minority 
communities have to compete over. And what that has meant is that many 
black leaders have reinforced the colour line to some extent because they have 
been forced to advance their interests over those of other minorities for the 
limited resources. Consequently, appeals to the purity of ethnoracial tradition 
and essentialist culture become paramount. Appeals to hybridity don't get 
you very far because they weaken and undermine the legitimacy of identity 
claims. And then the right wheels in the latest scientific racism like The Bell 
Curve which suggest to policy makers that no use of resources is going to 
change the situation of minorities who are seen as 'cognitively disabled'. And 
so in a pro-scarcity politics, targeted at the poor and minorities, this 
combination of social Darwinism and scientific racism translates into a 
reduction of the resources necessary to ensure rights and freedoms. 
Obviously any kind of left libertarian politics has to argue against this 
situation in what ever ways are possible and to talk about public affluence 
and enfranchisement and empowerment in ways that go beyond scarcity 
politics and that's what I mean by post-scarcity politics - abolish the idea of 
scarcity because scarcity politics is always a manipulation of a category to 
impose recessionary strategies upon certain sectors of the population. 
KB: In "The Ecology of Images', which first appeared in the South Atlantic 
Quarterly and which is included in a reworked form in your most recent book, 
you noted the near complete absence of 'media oriented ... discussion of 
ecological issues'. Having read that I immediately mentally cast about for 
examples of such representations and thought of a relatively commercially 
successful example from Australia, the film Cane Toads which deals with the 
ecological problems caused by the introduction of cane toads into the sugar 
cane fields of Queensland. It seems to me that much of the public acceptance 
of the film was grounded in the ironic representation of the topic. Your most 
recent work is concerned in certain ways with dispelling the public image of 
the ecology movement as a strict anti-libertarian politics, while a recent 
review in Australia of this work stated that 'Ross is that most necessary thing 
in cultural studies, a critical ironist'. If you accept this characterisation, would 
you also accept that by necessity of its subject, ecological debate requires an 
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ironic voice to dispel the seriousness which stems from its appeal to scientific 
knowledge? 
AR: That's a good question. This seriousness is surprising, especially given that so 
many of our direct encounters with the natural world are often so surprising 
and contrarian. The house style of so much environmentalism is apocalyptic 
or evangelistic and in science itself varieties of geewhizzery or technocratic 
sobriety tend to be the house styles. Critical irony doesn't go a long way in 
either context. For me irony is a legacy of traditions of radical scepticism in 
leftist thinking and progressive temper in general. It's also a legacy of the 
'personal is political' translated into style, a difficult habit to let go, although 
I've often been criticised for that sense of irony because it's easily trivialised 
by sensation journalism in the current, rabid climate. 
KB: I would like to move now from aspects of what you have in your work called 
a 'green cultural criticism' to questions related to the theory of cultural 
studies in general. In your Introduction to Microphone Fiends I noticed an 
absence of reference to the term 'opposition' and you refer to 'resistance' as 
'an overused term'. I find this noteworthy given the frequent use of these 
words in cultural studies work. In place of these terms you have focused on a 
language of what you refer to as 'anger and activism' which emerges from the 
subject of contemporary youth music and youth culture. While such a language 
in a sense redefines the themes of an earlier cultural studies, doesn't it also 
indulge the subculture it represents? As with traditional cultural studies, 
doesn't it leave the centre (what was once referred to as the dominant) 
un(der) theorised? 
AR: It probably does. Questions about political economy have been undertheorised 
in a lot of cultural studies work but probably not as much as is often alleged. 
But it's relative to what cultural studies undertook in the first place which 
was to provide a corrective to traditions of thinking which had under- 
theorised cultural politics itself. I have always thought that cultural studies 
shouldn't be the only story to tell about anything. Such stories have to be told 
in conjunction with the hard domination theories of political economy - the 
theories of the centre to which you refer. But I have to confess that I am a little 
leery about talking about cultural studies in general (which is part of the 
symptom of denial of people involved in cultural studies). In general, I think 
that there has been too much talk about cultural studies and not enough 
doing it. 
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Getting back to your question, there has been something of a rapprochement, 
particularly in the US in recent years - as a result of the culture wars - 
between the cultural justice and the social justice wings of progressive thinking. 
This is the division which I think you are referring to in your question. I think 
it's impossible now after the culture wars to say that cultural politics is a 
diversionary side-show. 
KB: Have you noted any particularly progressive - or fruitful - recent 
developments in the practice of cultural studies? 
AR: One development is the fact that the right has taken on the cause of cultural 
politics in the US and that many intellectuals have been drawn into these 
debates, not on their own terms, but nonetheless in a way that seriously 
addresses the relationship between culture and the state. In many ways these 
have been debates about cultural policy in a kind of ad hoc way, different 
from the debates in Australia, for example, about cultural policy which have 
a formal administrative framework. The policy frameworks which exist 
largely in the US are neo-conservative, and they exist in the private think 
tanks and foundations that were set up largely in the 1980s to circumvent the 
intellectual input of academics. 
The most recent debate within cultural studies has been the reintroduction f
a discourse about values. Simon Frith's latest book, Performing Sites, points 
out that after twenty ears of banishing the language of value judgments from 
cultural studies, the only place where people don't make value judgments is 
in cultural studies classrooms. But how you reintroduce the language of 
values is a complex phenomenon, and again it varies from culture to culture. 
For example, at present in the US the language of values is totally claimed by 
the 'family values' crowd. 
KB: The place of texts in cultural studies is problematic. Traditionally, cultural 
studies has tended to privilege the study of literary texts, and one example 
here is the ways in which the organisers of the 'Marxism and the Interpretation 
of Culture' conference situated your contribution to that conference within 
the collected volume of conference papers. Having said that, I've noticed in 
your recent work a move away from the study of literary (and film) texts 
towards the study of sources which include anthropological tracts, computer 
programs, various moral and ecological panics, Susan Sontag's On 
Photography, and the products and practices of the biotechnology industry. 
Has the shift in texts employed been directed by a recognition that cogent 
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answers to the questions of power and culture which motivate your analyses 
are to be found in the study of the latter sources? 
AR: I would probably want to down play your characterisation ofthe study of 
literary texts within cultural studies. I think perhaps even quite the opposite, 
cultural studies has been associated with the displacement of literary value 
from its commanding role at least within the humanities ide of the field of 
knowledge. For the most part cultural studies has been associated with 
attention to visually and technologically mediated culture where questions 
about authority and power are, as you say, largely negotiated and exercised 
across a much wider range of cultural sources and practices. That paper you 
refer to is from an earlier part of my career when I was a poetry critic. It was 
actually the love of American poetry that first brought me to the US. The 
editors of that collection may have been emphasising those literary aspects in 
order to appeal to a literary criticism audience. 
Cultural studies in the social sciences has been used as a way of warding off 
the tendency to select empirical reason as the model for the social sciences 
and so there has been more of a friendly espousal of literary theory among 
social scientists. I think quite the opposite is the case among humanists 
involved in cultural studies, a large proportion of whom have probably been 
trained in literary studies and are in full flight from that training. 
KB: Your reference here to the break-down of the traditional disciplines, or at 
least a realignment of disciplines, leads into my next question. Throughout 
the writings by those working in the field of cultural studies there are 
objections to the commodification a d disciplinisation of the field. In one of 
your writings, 'Giving Culture Hell7, you stated that 'Breathing ets difficult 
for me when cultural studies is almost wholly reduced ... to yet another 
academic debate about how to define a disciplinary object7. We can avoid this 
condition since my question is not necessarily concerned with defining cultural 
studies as a discipline. Rather, what problems or issues do you see associated 
with moves to entrench cultural studies as a discipline? 
AR: That again differs not just from country to country but also from location to 
location in terms of different universities. In Britain, for example, in the wake 
of Thatcherism cultural studies as a discipline has been extraordinarily 
successful. In Australia, where there has been a relatively benign social 
democratic administration the concern has been with cultural policy. In the 
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great byzantine behemoth which is the US higher education system, the 
situation varies from campus to campus depending on the resources available. 
Tendencies associated with cultural studies flourish on some campuses in the 
field of literature and others in anthropology and others in communications, 
and so on. Overall, there are really no cultural studies programs up and 
running in the US. Despite all of the talk about cultural studies there is 
nowhere for graduates to go to get such a degree which is perhaps ymptomatic 
of the desire of certain folks in cultural studies not to institutionalise. 
KB: Further to this issue I would like to repeat a question you posed in the piece, 
'Giving Culture Hell', namely, what is cultural studies for? 
AR: Well, I can't answer that one. For me personally it has been a lot about 
learning how to be a citizen in the fullest possible sense, grounding oneself in 
a certain cultural history and finding a voice that tries to bridge the journalistic 
and the academic. In terms of writing, cultural studies for me has always 
meant trying to write as a non-expert. 
KB: Your desire to write as a non-expert is reflected in the dedication of Strange 
Weather in which you thank 'all the science teachers you never had'. 
AR: That got me into trouble in the science wars. It's one of those little ironic 
sayings that has been widely circulated. Itgot lifted out of context by sensational 
journalism as evidence of a celebration of ignorance. 
KB: I must apologise at the outset if my next question runs the risk of provoking 
an attack of the kind of asphyxia you mentioned. Recently in an interview in 
New York magazine you mentioned looking to a 'postdisciplinary' American 
Studies program. How would such a program differ from the established 
emphases within American Studies upon 'interdisciplinarity'? 
AR: American Studies in the US context, at least, is the oldest interdisciplinary 
field. Its chauvinist origins as a field that celebrates a certain vision of 
nationalism associated with World War Two made it a very convenient 
vehicle for consensus scholarship and consensus politics in the immediate 
postwar period. That embarrassing use made of interdisciplinarity is something 
that most people working in the field have long tried to disavow. 
The period of critical nationalism from the 1960s through the early 1980s was 
a period when American Studies was struggling to survive, trying to compete 
with many other interdisciplinary programs, mostly ethnic studies programs 
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and women's studies programs which were springing up. It survived 
remarkably well and has been very much in a boom phase in the last ten years 
or so. 
Now the current horizon is not just the postnational phase of American 
Studies but also the move to involve social scientists more, and as a result I 
think a lot of the aspirations of scholars of my generation to something like 
postdisciplinary work have been projected onto American Studies - certainly 
in my case that's true. What postdisdplinarity really means is something else: 
it's a Utopian project in some respects. Where you draw the line between 
something that is interdisciplinary and postdisciplinary probably depends on 
the next generation of scholars working through institutional structures that 
my generation is trying to create. 
KB: You consistently speak of disciplinary fields such as the humanities and the 
social sciences rather than specific disciplines. Perhaps, in that language 
practice, we can locate the beginnings of a postdisdplinarity. 
AR: One reflection of such a shift in emphasis is that here at New York University 
the American Studies program is under the aegis of social science, not the 
humanities, which to me is a welcome move. 
KB: That moves on to my next question. I find it interesting given the content of 
many American Studies forums that the conference you organised at Princeton 
University in November 1992 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the 
American Studies program was on the theme of 'Youth Music and Youth 
Culture'. I read this as a new direction, indeed an invigoration, of American 
Studies. Will you be incorporating courses on youth music and youth culture 
in the program at NYU? 
AR: Our particular focus is on urban culture, but we encourage all sorts of work. 
What we did here was basically to take over one of the oldest graduate 
programs in American Studies in the country and reformulate it along 
transdisciplinary lines. Like most American Studies programs, its former 
existence was tied to literature and history. Students would eventually 
spedalise in one or the other. I did away with those requirements and 
grouped together scholars from different departments more by reference to 
their intellectual training than by coverage of periods and created fields such 
as sdence, technology, and society; popular culture and daily life; gender, 
race, and sexuality; ideologies and political economy; law, institutions, and 
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social movements; media studies; cultural analysis; indigenous America; 
urban and community studies; nations and transnationalism. Students 
specialise within three of these fields. I'm very sanguine about American 
Studies, obviously. I wouldn't have taken over this job if I hadn't have been. 
KB: You argued before that part of the cultural studies work you do is directed at 
becoming a better citizen. Would you translate that into a relationship between 
cultural studies and American Studies by saying that one of the aims of the 
American Studies program here is to develop citizenship among students of 
American Studies? 
AR: To some extent. There is a tinge of irony associated with that given that 
critiques of the excesses of nationalism would be part and parcel of coining to 
citizenship. Yet that is a fairly reasonable way of putting it if one has in mind 
someone who is generally informed and participatory in different public 
spheres. In other words, it's the opposite pedagogical ideal of the specialised 
field career academic. 
KB: In the review from Australia of your latest book which I have mentioned, the 
critic stated that 'whether he likes it or not, Professor Andrew Ross is a 
celebrity'. It could be added that this status is implicated with your role as an 
intellectual. If this assumption is correct, then it impacts upon the issue you 
raised in Universal Abandon? and which permeates No Respect concerning the 
'role of the intellectual in an age that rejects intellectual vanguardism and 
vanguardist intellectuals alike7. Is this still the case? Does the age continue to 
reject intellectual vanguardism and vanguardist intellectuals? 
AR: In the US, it's obvious that progressive intellectuals have very little opportunity 
to sway public opinion. I think that the most that could be said is that our job 
has been to try to keep liberals honest, something which is increasingly 
difficult in the current climate. We tend to be in a position of providing free 
therapy for liberals these days. I think they should pay for their therapy quite 
frankly. But the celebrity part of it is very much a negative celebrity and has 
come out of this neo-McCarthyist climate whereby certain intellectuals 
associated with radical ideas or radical politics have been selected by 
sensational journalism for caricaturing, and I've been one of those people 
chosen in recent years for that role. The alternative, of course, is self- 
marginalisation, which the left has made a career of in the US. 
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But the whole question of celebrity culture is something that deserves analysis 
in itself. Academics in particular always think they're immune to developments 
in other sectors of society, but of course they're not. The academy has shared 
in the low-wage revolution and employment crisis visited upon everyone 
else. Also, we have seen the infamous practice of academic gossip elevated to 
the order of celebrity, something that the public media and glossy journalism 
have exploited. And academics, for all their alleged sophistication at reading 
literary texts, are extraordinarily illiterate when it comes to reading media 
characterisations ofthe academic scene, and thus they are easy prey. Obviously 
there is no reason why intellectuals hould be immune to such attacks, 
whether they like it or not. 
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